This chapter contains sections titled: I II III IV V.

Technological advancements, especially with regard to enhancements of human capacities and powers, have instigated a collision between opposing views of the human person. I begin with the premise that the predominant classical view of the human person attained its clearest and most cogent expression in the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas and can be termed the theory of the homo integralis. The human person is, for Thomas, the integrated being par excellence: he is a union of the material (body) and the (...) immaterial (soul); his freedom is guided by a normative nature; he is himself a product of and participant in nature; he is a member of a common species from which he draws his identity; and he balances the needs of his embodied state with a recognition that his existence is not limited to it. Due to the philosophical and technological revolutions of the modern period, themselves an outgrowth perhaps of earlier attitudes, a contrasting view of the human person emerged: the homo technologicus. Technological man, unlike his classical predecessor, is marked by fundamental disintegration: he is divided in himself, between mind and body; he is dissociated from a normative human nature; he is divided from nature itself as he sets himself against it through technological means; he is divided from the human community in radical, self-determining autonomy; and he is severed from any sense of transcendent purpose or value aside from that which can be attained through his own powers, technological or otherwise. By recovering a sense of the homo integralis as articulated by Thomas Aquinas, a fresh appraisal of contemporary issues regarding the human relationship to technology, human capacities and powers as evaluated by movements like transhumanism, and ultimately, human meaning and value, is made possible and is shown to provide a consistent and appealing rejoinder to the disintegrated vision of man that emerges in a technologized world. (shrink)

Technological advancements, especially with regard to enhancements of human capacities and powers, have instigated a collision between opposing views of the human person. I begin with the premise that the predominant classical view of the human person attained its clearest and most cogent expression in the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas and can be termed the theory of the homo integralis. The human person is, for Thomas, the integrated being par excellence: he is a union of the material (body) and the (...) immaterial (soul); his freedom is guided by a normative nature; he is himself a product of and participant in nature; he is a member of a common species from which he draws his identity; and he balances the needs of his embodied state with a recognition that his existence is not limited to it. Due to the philosophical and technological revolutions of the modern period, themselves an outgrowth perhaps of earlier attitudes, a contrasting view of the human person emerged: the homo technologicus. Technological man, unlike his classical predecessor, is marked by fundamental disintegration: he is divided in himself, between mind and body; he is dissociated from a normative human nature; he is divided from nature itself as he sets himself against it through technological means; he is divided from the human community in radical, self-determining autonomy; and he is severed from any sense of transcendent purpose or value aside from that which can be attained through his own powers, technological or otherwise. By recovering a sense of the homo integralis as articulated by Thomas Aquinas, a fresh appraisal of contemporary issues regarding the human relationship to technology, human capacities and powers as evaluated by movements like transhumanism, and ultimately, human meaning and value, is made possible and is shown to provide a consistent and appealing rejoinder to the disintegrated vision of man that emerges in a technologized world. (shrink)

In this paper, I examine the philosophical foundations of the regulation of edible things with particular emphasis on interpretations of the ontological relationship between the categories of 'food' and 'drugs.' To illustrate the diversity of possible approaches to the regulation of food and drugs and their correlative ontological commitments, I focus on two different examples: the United States Food and Drug Administration's Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act and the development of India's Ministry of Ayurveda, Yoga and Naturopathy, Unani, Siddha, (...) and Homeopathy. In my examination of these two regulatory bodies, my goal is not to provide a universal or absolute answer as to how the food-drug relationship ought to be interpreted or codified within regulatory policy. Rather, I aim to provide support for the following claims: these regulatory policies are undergirded by philosophical assumptions regarding the ontological relationship between the categories of food and drugs, the regulatory structure of the US Food & Drug Administration rests on a dichotomous interpretation of the food-drug relationship, India's Ministry of AYUSH rests on an interpretation of the food-drug relationship that understands the categories of 'food' and 'drugs' as overlapping with one another, and each of these approaches to the regulation of edible things has unique advantages and disadvantages that ought to be recognized and evaluated in developing and revising policy for the regulation of edible things. (shrink)

This rich and varied collection of essays addresses some of the most fundamental human questions through the lenses of philosophy, literature, religion, politics, and theology. Peter Augustine Lawler and Dale McConkey have fashioned an interdisciplinary consideration of such perennial and enduring issues as the relationship between nature and history, nature and grace, reason and revelation, classical philosophy and Christianity, modernity and postmodernity, repentance and self-limitation, and philosophy and politics.

This paper examines the nature of ‘reasonable’ argumentation in Generation of Animals III.10. Its aim is to develop an alternative to the dialectical construal of reasonable argumentation in Aristotle recently favoured by Robert Bolton. On the basis of a close textual analysis I show that the reasonable arguments deployed in Generation of Animals III.10 do not appeal to endoxa or reputable beliefs per se. Instead, they rely upon general facts about animals established by empirical induction. This implies that, contra Bolton, (...) not all reasonable arguments in Aristotle are dialectical; some, in fact, are thoroughly empirical and scientific. I conclude by suggesting that such empirical reasonable arguments even have a place in the De Caelo, the treatise that Bolton primarily focused upon when developing his interpretation. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that there is an inconsistency between two presentist doctrines: that of ontological symmetry and asymmetry of fixity. The former refers to the presentist belief that the past and future are equally unreal. The latter refers to the A-Theoretic intuition that the past is closed or actual, and the future is open or potential. My position in this paper is that the presentist is unable to account for the temporal asymmetry that is so fundamentally a part (...) of her theory. In Section I, I briefly outline a recent defence of presentism due to Craig, and argue that a flaw in this defence highlights the tension between the presentist's doctrines of ontological symmetry and asymmetry of fixity. In Section II, I undertake an investigation, on the presentist's behalf, in order to determine whether she is capable of reconciling these two doctrines. In the course of the investigation, I consider different asymmetries, other than that of ontology, which might be said fundamentally to constitute temporal asymmetry, and the asymmetry of fixity in particular. In Section III, I also consider whether the presentist is able to avail herself of some of the standard B-Theoretic accounts of the asymmetry of fixity, and argue that she cannot. Finally, I conclude that temporal asymmetry cannot be accounted for (or explained) other than through the postulation of an ontological asymmetry. (shrink)

The tu quoque argument is the argument that since in the end rationalism rests on an irrational choice of and commitment to rationality, rationalism is as irrational as any other commitment. Popper's and Polanyi's philosophies of science both accept the argument, and have on that account many similarities; yet Popper manages to remain a rationalist whereas Polanyi decided for an irrationalist version of rationalism. This is more marked in works of their respective followers, W. W. Bartley III and Thomas S. (...) Kuhn. Bartley declares the rationalist's very openness to criticism open to criticism, in the hope of rendering Popper's critical rationalism quite comprehensive. Kuhn makes rationality depend on the existence of an accepted model for scientific research (paradigm), thus rendering Polanyi's view of the authority of scientific leadership a sine qua non for scientific progress. The question raised here is, in what sense is a rationalist committed to his rationality, or an irrationalist to his specific axiom ? The tradition views only the life?long commitment as real. Viewing rationality as experimental open?mindedness, we may consider a rationalist unable to retreat into any life?long commitment ? even commitment to science. In this way the logic of the tu quoque argument is made irrelevant: anyone able to face the choice between rationality and commitment is already beyond such a choice; it is one thing to be still naïve and another ? and paradoxical ? thing to return to one's naïveté. (shrink)

The goal of this paper is to increase our understanding of what archaic verse epitaphs meant to contemporary readers. Section I suggests their fundamental message was praise of the deceased, expressed in forms characteristic of poetic encomium in its broad, rhetorical sense, i.e., praise poetry. In section II, the conventions of encomium in the epitaphs are compared to the iconographic conventions of funerary art. I conclude that verse inscriptions and grave markers, not only communicate the same message of praise, but (...) do so in a formally parallel manner. Section III, drawing on Pindar as a preserver of archaic thinking, attributes the parallelism between verse epitaph and grave marker to their common debt to funerary ritual. The epigrams will be seen to share with their monuments the goal of memorializing this ritual. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:THE TELEOLOGICAL ARGUMENT JOSEPH MIXIE Rhode Island College Providence, Rhode Island I. Introduction M ANY PHILOSOPHERS think that any argument for the existence of God is " mere metaphysical speculation." Often these philosophers use the criteria of scientific empiricism as the standard for an "acceptable" scientific theory, regardless of the subject matter. While acknowledging Kuhn's work, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, and the insights it gives us regarding (...) how the nature of scientific theories and paradigms change, it is still appropriate to ask whether any argument for the existence of God can be formulated in such a way so as to fulfill the currently acceptable criteria of scientific empiricism. I shall explore the possibility of formulating the argument from design as an empirical scientific theory. There are currently several schools of thought regarding the criteria of scientific empiricism.1 Rudolf Carnap argued in Philosophical Foundations of Physics that scientific empiricism should proceed according to verificationist methodology.2 Imre Lakatos in his work entitled Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge discusses several schools of scientific methodology including conventionalism, sophisticated methodological falsificationism, and 1 For an anthology on this subject see the essays included in Janet A. Kourany, Scientific Knowledge, Part 3, "The Validation of Scientific Knowledge," p. 112-227. 2 Rudolf Carnap, Philosophical Foundations of Physics (New York: Basic Books, 1966), chapter 2. 635 636 JOSEPH MIXIE justificationism.3 (Sect. 1, 2, and 3 of "Falsification and Methodology of Scientific Research Programs "). One major school of thought regarding the criteria of scientific empiricism is that of falsificationism. Karl Popper was one of the leading exponents of falsificationism and both presented and defended that position in his works entitled Science: Coniectures and Refutation and The Logic of Scien:tific Discovery.4 For the purposes of this paper, I will adopt Popper's criteria of falsification. II. Revised Teleological Argument I shall consider a form of the argument from design which infers the existence of God from our experience of instances of natural order. I shall discuss the notion of natural order in greater detail later in this paper. I shall not count as instances of natural order those patterns which appear randomly in nature from time to time. Consider the following formulation of the argument from design in modus ponens argument form: (1) If there are instances of natural order (N0), then there is intelligent design of these instances of natural order (D). (2) There are instances of natural order (NO). (3) Therefore, there is intelligent design of these instances of natural order (D). The acceptance of the truth of the conclusion that there is intelligent design depends upon the strength of the evidence for the antecedent-consequent relation in premise ( 1) between natural order (N0) and the existence of a designer (D). The evidence for the truth of the antecedent, required for premise (2), is provided in Section IV and I shall argue in Section VI for the acceptance of the truth of the antecedent-consequent relation. s Imre Lakatos, Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1970), sections I, 2, and 3 of "Falsification and Methodology of Scientific Research Programs." 4 Karl Popper, Conjectures and Refutations (New York: Basic Books, 1962) and The Logic of Scientific Discovery (New York: Basic Books, 1959). THE TELEOLOGICAL ARGUMENT 637 III. The Scientific Criterion1 Recall Popper's method of empirical falsification. According to Popper, for a claim to qualify as empirical, a minimal requirement is that there be some evidence from experience which would indicate the claim to be false. Popper writes in The Logic of Scientific Discovery: But I shall admit a system as empirical or scientific only if it is capable of being tested by experience. These considerations suggest that not the verifiability but the falsifiability of a system is to be taken as a criteria of demarcation. In other words: I shall not require of a scientific system that it shall be capable of being singled out, once and for all, in a positive sense; but I shall require that its logical form shall be such that it can be singled out, by means of empirical tests, in a negative sense: it must be possible for an... (shrink)

Analytic debates about truth are wide-ranging, but certain key themes tend to crop up time and again. The three themes that we will examine in this paper are (i) the nature and behaviour of the ordinary concept of truth, (ii) the meaning of discourse about truth, and (iii) the nature of the property truth. We will start by offering a brief overview of the debates centring on these themes. We will then argue that cross-linguistic experimental philosophy has an indispensable yet (...) underappreciated role to play in all of these debates. Recognising the indispensability of cross-linguistic experimental philosophy should compel philosophers to significantly revise the ways in which they inquire about truth. It should also prompt analytic philosophers more generally to consider whether similar revisions might be necessary elsewhere in the field. (shrink)

LANGUAGE NOTE | Document text in English ; abstract also in Chinese. This paper explores the need for and place of input from local cultures and religious traditions when addressing the highly complex questions that frequently arise in the field of bioethics, something which is often overlooked and even questioned in much of the relevant academic literature. It begins by examining the historical roots of religious bioethics and the secularization of the discipline before then recounting the experience of the Bioethics, (...) Multiculturalism and Religion Project of the UNESCO Chair in Bioethics and Human Rights. Over the past 12 years, this Project has brought together Christians, Buddhists, Confucians, Daoists, Jews, Hindus, Muslims, and secular ethicists in eight encounters to discuss bioethical topics. First, the paper describes the different orientations, goals and methodological changes involved in these encounters. The methodology of meeting evolving is a search for possible convergence or common ground in the Project. The paper then addresses the most salient questions that have emerged these years. They are i) the problem of universalism vs. pluralism, which is witnessed in global bioethics vs. local diversity; ii) the East-West divide on the conception of human rights vs. duties; iii) cross-cultural and interreligious dialogue goals are framed as convergence, consensus or conversation; and iv) the ongoing issue of science and faith as different traditions confront modernity. 本文在探討解決生命倫理學領域經常出現的高度複雜問題時，當地文化和宗教傳統的涉入是必要的，也是應該具有一定地位的，但這一點在許多相關的學術文獻中卻經常被忽視，甚至被質疑。本文首先考察宗教生命倫理學的歷史 根源和該學科的世俗化，然後敘述聯合國教科文組織生命倫理學和人權教席的“生命倫理學、多元文化與宗教”國際項目的經驗。在過去12年裡，該項目將基督教、佛教、儒教、道教、猶太教、印度教、穆斯林教及世俗倫理學 的學者聚集在一起，進行了8次會議，討論生命倫理學課題。本文首先描述這些會議所涉及的不同取向、目標和方法論的演變。方法論的演變是為了尋求項目可能的趨同點或共同點。然後，本文討論這些年出現的最突出的問題。 它們是：i)普遍主義與多元主義問題，即體現在全球生命倫理學與地方倫理學之間的問題；ii)東西方在人權與義務概念上的分歧；iii)跨文化和跨宗教對話的目標應該被框定為趨同、共識還是對談；以及iv)在不同 傳統面對現代性時所持績存在的科學與信仰之間的問題。. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:JOSEPH MARGOLIS THE LOGIC AND STRUCTURES OF FICTIONAL NARRATIVE The fascination of fiction and narrative is plainly immense, sind current analyses are notably fresh and ingenious. But ifone were to venture a compendious account of die most strategic conceptual claims bearing on those notions, they might well be captured by the following three theses: (i) that fiction and narrative are logically quite distinct, without necessarily excluding one anodier; (...) (ii) that fictional worlds are no worlds at all; they are merely imagined to exist; and (iii) that events, whether actual or imagined, cannot be specified independently of the categories by which we identify them as the events they are, categories subject to change over time. What is intriguing about mese three claims is that they strike the ear as utterly commonplace and obvious. But that is dieir strength. For it would be a great convenience if the relevant puzzles generated by analytic philosophy, hermeneutics, the new narratology, semiotics and the like could be resolved, convincingly, by appeal to die implications of these diree homely trudis. In addition, diey affect one another in a rather complicated way, and, taken joindy, easily expose certain influential false starts. The import of (iii), for example, is notably ignored in die otherwise powerful analysis of narrative afforded by Gérard Genette. Its bearing on (i) utterly undermines the explicit dualism favored by Seymour Chatman, who is clearly influenced by Genette himself. The failure to mark die force of (i) and its analogue regarding poetry is most obvious in I. A. Richards's contrast between poetry and science, the work of the Prague circle, Northrop Frye's Anatomy of Criticism, and such recent speech-act theories of poetry and fiction as those proposed by Richard Ohmann, Monroe Beardsley, and Mary Louise Pratt. The corresponding failure widi respect to (ii) is clear in John Searle's theory of reference and in die ontological claims made by Nicholas Wolterstorff. The connection between (i) and (ii) is muddled most famously by G. E. Moore. These charges suggest die quarrelsome promise of the intended economy. But, as we shall see, they also lead in the direction of a more constructive theory of texts and their interpretation and of die constraints of narrative and style diat affect fiction. 162 Joseph Margolis163 Fiction, we say, differs from reality as well as from legend. But in speaking thus, we betray an understandable confidence that these three kinds of"world"— or, these three worlds — are conceptually well-behaved and open to straightforward demarcation. Once more, we slip altogether too easily between talking about certain worlds and about the narrative accounts by which we do so. What distinguishes fictional reference? we ask, and what is a fictional world? The best way to proceed here is to begin with strong intuitions and to trace dieir systematic consequences in order to test how far they are unassailable — or whether and where they must yield to others that are more accommodating. One particularly promising equivocation is the following. We speak of fictional worlds as possible (but not actual) worlds; but even if what is possible in a fictional world corresponds (in some sense) to what is possible in the actual world, it is not, as such, a possibility of or at the actual world. The "possible worlds" idiom is fundamentally and doubly equivocal. For, a "possible world" signifies either what is merely logically or conceptually compossible, or what (under suitably referential, predicative, causal, and similar constraints) is compossible specifically with respect to the actual world (or some part of it). Certainly, Balzac's La Cousine Bette "presents" an imaginary world that is internally coherent and compossible. One might even say, ignoring its fictive nature, diat such a world — or events very much like those of the story — is compossible with a certain portion of the actual world of nineteenth-century France. But Lewis Carroll's Alice in Wonderfond, though it scrupulously presents a coherent world of compossible events, does not present a world compossible with the actual world. And, on certain views at least, Thomas Mann's The Transposed Heads presents a possible world that is a conceptual impossibility. There is, however, no need to quarrel about particular cases... (shrink)

This paper considers the problem of closeness in the ethical use of intention. In section I, attempts inspired by Anscombe to use a “coarse grained” understanding of intention, to deal with certain difficult cases, are rejected. In section II it is argued that the difficult cases can be addressed using other moral principles. In section III a more detailed account of intention is set out, analysing intention as a reason for action, and in section IV two paradoxes apparently created by (...) this account are addressed: on the contrast between intentions and intentional action, and the difference between killing a group of people together or individually. In section V another set of cases is considered, to test how this account of intention handles the intention of harm. Section VI considers the objection that an agent may cause what is a harm without intending it as a harm. (shrink)

La cuestión de si los lenguajes intensionalesson más expresivos que los lenguajes nointensionalessurge en el marco de unaperspect i va semánt i ca de l as t eorí as.Desde esta perspectiva, la cuestión esesta. ¿Hay clases modelo que se puedencaracterizar mediante teorías que usanconceptos intensionales que no se puedencaracterizar mediante teorías que no usanconceptos intensionales? Se sugiere unaformulación precisa de esta cuestión, perono se ofrece una respuesta.Para aproxi marse a est a cuest i ón, seresume la teoría de modelos de (...) primerorden [II] y se revisa el enfoque semánticode las teorías que emplea incrementost eóri cos, no i nt ensi onal es, de pri merorden [III].Los i nc r e me nt os t e ór i c os de pr i me rorden se bosquejan pero no se definenr i g u r o s a me n t e [ I V] . E s t e l e n g u a j ei n t e n s i o n a l pr o po r c i o n a e l a p a r a t op a r a a t r i b u i r u s o d e l l e n g u a j e yact i t udes i nt ens i onal es a i ndi vi duoscuyo comportami ento es el obj eto deinvestigación. También proporciona elaparato para habl ar sobre traducci óndel lenguaj e atribuido al lenguaj e delinvestigador.La cuestión inicial se convierte entoncesen si hay clases modelo que se puedanc a r a c t e r i z a r me d i a n t e i n c r e me n t o sintencionales de lógica de primer ordenq ue n o pue de n s e r c a pt ur a do s po rincrementos teóricos no-intensionales [V].The ques t i on of whet her i nt ens i onallanguages are more expressive than nonintensional languages is raised within the framework of a semantic view of theories. Fromthis perspective, the question isthis. Are there model classes that can becharacterized by theories using intensionalconcepts that cannot be characterizedby theories that do not use intensionalconcepts? A precise formulation of thisquestion is suggested, but no answer isgiven.To approach this question, model theory offirst order theories is summarized [II] andthe semantic approach to theories usingnon-intensional, theoretical augmentationsof first order theories is reviewed [III].I n t e n s i o n a l a u g me n t a t i o n s o f f i r s torder theories are sketched [IV] but notr i gor ous l y de f i ne d. Thi s i nt e ns i onall anguage provi des t he apparat us f orattributing language use and intensionalattitudes to individuals whose behavioris the object investigation. It also providesapparatus for talking about translationf r om t he at t r i but e d l anguage t o t heinvestigator’s language.T h e i n i t i a l q u e s t i o n t h e n b e c o me swhet her t here are model cl asses t hatc a n be c ha r a c t e r i z e d by i nt e ns i ona laugmentations of first order logic thatcannot be captured by non-intensionaltheoretical augmentations [V]. (shrink)

Machine generated contents note: Contributors ix -- Foreword by Douglas A. Boyd andJoseph D. Straubhaar xiii -- Preface byMariaHenson xv -- Acknowledgments xvii -- Part I. Introduction 1 -- Chapter 1. Journalism as a Mission: Ethics and Purpose -- from an International Perspective -- by Joseph B. Atkins 3 -- Chapter 2. Chaos and Order: Sacrificing the Individual for the -- Sake of Social Harmony -- by John C. Merrill 17 -- Part II. In the United States and Latin (...) America 37 -- Chapter 3. Ways of a Muckraker -- by Jerry Mitchell 39 -- Chapter 4. A Sinister Zone of Likeness: Journalists as Heroes and -- Villains in the U.S. South and in Central and Eastern -- Europe -- by Joseph B. Atkins 45 -- Chapter 5. From Collusion to Independence: The Press, The Ruling -- Party, and Democratization in Mexico -- byMichaelSnodgrass 55 -- Chapter 6. The Outspoken Journalist Is an Expression, a Symbol -- of Colombia -- by Stephen E Jackson 69 -- Part III. In Europe 77 -- Chapter 7. The Stranger: Minorities and Their Treatment -- in the German Media -- by Georg Ruhrmann 79 -- Chapter 8. Between State Control and the Bottom Line: -- Journalism and Journalism Ethics in Hungary -- by Ildiko Kaposi and Eva Vajda 91 -- Chapter 9. SITA: Slovakia's First Independent News Service and -- Its Battles with the Huey Long of the Danube -- byPavol Mudry 101 -- Chapter 10. Holding Politicians' Feet to the Fire in Slovenia -- by Bernard Nezmah 111 -- Part IV. In the Middle East and Africa 121 -- Chapter 11. Lebanese Television: Caught Between the -- Government and the Private Sector -- by Nabil Dajani 123 -- Chapter 12. Press Freedom and the Crisis of Ethical Journalism -- in Southern Africa -- by Regina Jere-Malanda 143 -- Chapter 13. Nigerian Press Ethics and the Politics of Pluralism -- by Minabere Ibelema 153 -- Part V. In South and East Asia 169 -- Chapter 14. The Indian Press: Covering an Enigma -- byJayanti Ram-Chandran 171 -- Chapter 15. Palace Intrigue in Katmandu and the Press in Nepal -- byAkhilesh Upadhyay 181 -- Chapter 16. The Press in Japan: Job Security versus -- Journalistic Mission -- by Takehiko Nomura 187 -- Part VI. Three Journalists and Their Missions 201 -- Chapter 17. A Journey in Journalism: From Idealism -- to Bankruptcy -- by Neil White III 203 -- Chapter 18. Reclaiming Responsibility: A Journalist and Artist -- in the Catholic Worker Movement -- by Chuck Trapkus 211 -- Chapter 19. Ryszard Kapuscinski: The Empathetic Existentialist -- by Joseph B. Atkins and Bernard Nezmah 217 -- Postscript The White Rose: On the Martyrdom of Student Pamphleteers in -- Nazi Germany and Their Legacy -- by Joseph B. Atkins 227 -- References 233 -- Index 243. (shrink)

The article is intended to, in Sections I and II, flesh out and put within a metaphilosophical framework the theoretical argument first made in 2002 in “Do Internet Stings Directed at Pedophiles Capture Offenders or Create Offenders? And Allied Questions” (Sexuality & Culture 6(4): 73–100), with some modifications (See note 14). Where there are differences, I stand by this version as the final version of the argument. Section III addresses three experimental or empirical studies which might be thought to contradict (...) or confirm the data of the 2002 study. Section IV compares what we have done with the one other jurisprudential argument made by Summer 2005. Section V discusses why, despite the evidence and the arguments, these sting operations are popular with prosecutors and the public alike. Section VI comments on why my empirical study dating to 2002 does not appear to have gained wide acceptance, and what, if anything, can be said about this. -/- Note: The unusual length (for me) of the article is justified by its being data-driven. (shrink)

Sur la base des travaux théologiques publiés par Ernst Troeltsch entre 1900 et 1913, rassemblés dans le volume 111 de ses Oeuvres , nous cherchons à montrer comment s'est précisée sa pensée sur la théologie durant cette période. Dans le but de l'intégrer à la culture scientifique, il lui assigne pour méthode et site l'histoire de la religion en général, et pour tâche propre l'exploration des connaissances normatives qui se dégagent de la finalité de cette histoire. La tâche spécifique de (...) la théolo­gie chrétienne est de situer la prédication de Jésus et celle de l'Église dans l'histoire universelle de la religion et de subvenir aux besoins spirituels de la communauté ; il lui trace, dans cette perspective, un programme de « dogmatique » inspiré de Schleiermacher.L'intérêt actuel de la pensée de Troeltsch est de souligner les condi­tionnements historiques du christianisme auxquels doit se soumettre la théologie. Cependant, ni son épistémologie ni sa conception téléologi­que de l'histoire ne peuvent fonder la méthode d'une théologie pour aujourd'hui. Trop préoccupé du déploiement de Hélée religieuse, il ne permet pas de penser la révélation de l'Absolu dans la contingence de l'événement et de la chair du Christ. Mais son souci du divorce entre la pensée chrétienne et la culture occidentale moderne nous encourage à frayer les voies du « libre christianisme » auquel il aspirait.On the basis of the theological works published by Ernst Troeltsch between 1900 and 1913, brought together in volume III of his Works , we would like to show how his thinking on theology during this period became more precise. In order to integrate it into scientific culture, he uses a method and background in the history of religion in general, and more particularly the exploration of normative knowl­edge that comes out of the finality of this history. The specific task of Christian theology is to situate the preaching of Jesus and that of the Church in the universal history of religion and to provide for the spiritual needs of the community. In this perspective he traces a program of “dogmatics" inspired by Schleiermacher.Today's interest in the thought of Troeltsch is to point out the historical conditions of a Christianity that ought to defer to theology. Nevertheless, neither his epistemol­ogy nor his theological conception of history are capable of laying the ground for a theological method today. Too preoccupied about the use of the religious Idea, he does not allow for reflection on revelation of the Absolute in the contingency of the event and theflesh of Christ. But his concern about the divorce between Christian thought and modern occidental culture encourages us to trace the paths of a 'free Chris­tianity " to which he aspires. (shrink)

The principal claims supported include: (i) that 'believe' and 'know' take the same grammatical object 'that p'; (ii) that each may take grammatical objects that the other cannot take; (iii) that merely grammatical considerations cannot determine whether 'that p' designates a proposition or a fact; (iv) that, on an epistemically relevant interpretation, 'that p' may be construed either as designating a proposition or a fact or both; (v) that propositions and facts are correlative and heuristic entities. The issues are developed (...) in the context of exploring chiefly the views of Zeno Vendler, Alan White, and Peter Geach. Complications bearing on the distinction between thought and speech are considered. (shrink)

The principal claims supported include: (i) that 'believe' and 'know' take the same grammatical object 'that p'; (ii) that each may take grammatical objects that the other cannot take; (iii) that merely grammatical considerations cannot determine whether 'that p' designates a proposition or a fact; (iv) that, on an epistemically relevant interpretation, 'that p' may be construed either as designating a proposition or a fact or both; (v) that propositions and facts are correlative and heuristic entities. The issues are developed (...) in the context of exploring chiefly the views of Zeno Vendler, Alan White, and Peter Geach. Complications bearing on the distinction between thought and speech are considered. (shrink)